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ROBERT A. HOLDERBY, Respondent, v. INTERNA-
TIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, 
LOCAL UNION NO. 12 (an Unincorporated Associa-
et Appellants. 
[1] Associations-Intervention of Courts-Conditions Precedent. 
-Generally, a plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against an 
organization of which he is a member must first invoke and 
exhaust the remedies provided by that organization applicable 
to his grievance. 
[2] !d.-Intervention of Courts-Conditions Precedent.-It is only 
when an organization violates its rules for appellate review 
or on a showing that it would be futile to invoke them that 
further pursuit of internal relief is excused; the violation of 
its own rules which inflicts the initial wrong furnishes no 
right for direct resort to the courts. 
[3] !d.-Intervention of Courts-Conditions Precedent.-Violation 
of other laws and wrongs done within an organization are 
intended to be conciliated and corrected by the appellate 
machinery provided therein if properly invoked by an ag-
grieved party and applied by the organization, and if recourse 
to such appellate machinery is not sought an aggrieved party 
foregoes his right to a judicial review regardless of the breach 
of its own rules by the organization in causing the grievance 
in the first instance. 
[ 4] Labor-Remedies-Conditions Precedent.-When an internal 
appeal is open to a member of a union, after its executive 
board has denied him reinstatement as a member in good 
standing, he has no right to invoke the aid of the courts where 
he has made no attempt to obtain such appeal and there is 
nothing to indicate that an appeal would not have been ac-
corded him in which to seek redress for the alleged wrongs. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarence M. Hanson, Judge. Reversed. 
Action seeking reinstatement in a union as a member in 
good standing, and for damages resulting from unlawful 
exclusion. Judgment for plaintiff reversed. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Associations and Clubs, §§ 16, 25; Am.Jur., 
Associations and Clubs, § 17 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1-3] Associations,§ 12; [4] Labor,§ 24. 
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Reese & McGee and G. Stan-
Aaron 
J.-This is an appeal the defendant Local 
Union Number 12 of the International Union of Operating 
from a for the plaintiff Robert A. 
Holderby in an action in which the plaintiff sought and ob-
tained reinstatement as a member in good standing in the 
union and damages resulting from his alleged unlawful ex· 
elusion therefrom. 
The plaintiff became a member of the union in October, 
1952. From November, 1952, until March, 1953, he was 
delinquent in his dues and for that reason was suspended 
from membership by the executive board of the union on 
February 5, 1953. Thereafter he applied for reinstatement 
and assigned illness as the reason for his delinquency. On 
March 17, 1953, the executive board addressed a letter to 
him stating the conditions of his reinstatement as follows: 
". . . it was the recommendation of the Advisory Board, 
concurred in by the Executive Board, that you be granted 
the privilege of Reinstating your membership by the pay-
ment of back Per Capita tax, Reinstatement Fee of $5.00, 
dues for the current month, and three months dues in ad-
vance." The executive board waived certain of the above 
items and gave a credit for $10 paid prior to March 17. It 
stated in its letter that there remained a balance of $19 
due and that in addition it required the plaintiff to furnish 
a doctor's certificate substantiating his illness. It appears 
that the requirements for reinstatement were consistent with 
the union's constitution. On April 29 a report certifying 
that the plaintiff had been a patient at a veterans' hospital 
was mailed to the financial secretary of the union. On May 
27 the plaintiff made final payment of the amount required 
for reinstatement pins dues to that date. Soon thereafter 
he was issued a referral slip for a work assignment on which 
the notation "dues paid rein 12" appeared. It may be as-
sumed that the notation was in recognition of the payment 
of dues and the plaintiff's reinstatement in Local 12. 
On June 6, 1953, the executive board of the union met 
and purported to reject the plaintiff's application for rein-
statement. The minutes of its meeting state that "A motion 
was made, seconded and carried that all previous action of 
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the Executive Board in the case of Robert A. be 
rescinded. A motion was made and seconded that the ap-
plication for reinstatement of Robert A. be re-
jected and that all moneys the Local Union by him 
be refunded. On the motion it vvas established 
that was not a and that his 
the past six months had marked him as an 
individual undesirable for in this Union." The 
plaintiff received a letter from the union advising him of 
his rejection and enclosing a check for as ''the total 
amount paid in by you on Initiation Permits, etc." 
On July 1, 1953, the commenced the present 
action. Article XVII, section 1 of the union's constitu-
tion provides in part as follows : ''Any General Officer who 
shall have filed in a Local Union a member 
thereof, and any officer or member of a Local Union, may 
appeal to the General Executive Board from the adoption 
of any action by said Local or from any decision ren-
dered by the General President. Local or mem-
ber thereof which belongs to a State or Provincial 
Organization or Joint Executive Board may appeal to the 
General Executive Board from any act or decision of said 
local, State or Provincial Organization or Joint Executive 
Board. . . . " Section 3 of that article states: "No suit or 
other action at law or equity shall be in any court 
by any member, officer or subdivision of the International 
Union of Operating Engineers until and unless all rights, 
remedies and provisions for hearing, trial and appeal within 
the Organization shall have been properly followed and ex-
hausted by the member, officer or subdivision complaining. 
. . . '' Prior to commencing this action the plaintiff did not 
avail himself of the remedies in the constitution 
for a review by the general executive board of the action 
taken against him. 
The plaintiff claims that on May 27, after he had fully 
complied with the requirements on which his reinstatement 
was conditioned, he automatically became fully reinstated 
to membership in the union; that thereafter the purported 
denial of his application for reinstatement was in realty an 
exclusion from membership without compliance with pro-
cedures established in the union's constitution, and that he 
was improperly deprived of valuable rights conferred upon 
him as a member of the union. (See Lawson v. Hewell, 118 
Cal. 613 [50 P. 763, 49 L.R.A. 400].) There is no question 
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but that provisions in the union constitution for the expulsion 
of members were not follo,ved. That document requires that 
formal charges be filed and a hearing be had. 
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff, specifically find-
ing that ''in accordance with the said letter of March 17, 
1953, the reinstatement of the plaintiff had been completed 
by May 28, 1953'' ; that he was a member in good standing 
on June 6, 1953, the date the alleged exclusionary action 
took place; that "he was entitled to all the rights and privi-
leges of membership at the said time," and that, "by reason 
of said action on the part of the Executive Board, plaintiff 
was thereby in effect, expelled from the defendant Local 
Union No. 12. . . . '' 
The foregoing findings of the court are supported by sub-
stantial evidence, and on appeal may not be successfully 
controverted by the defendant. However, it is contended 
that the plaintiff failed to exhaust the remedies available 
within the union and that he is not now entitled to judicial 
relief. 
[1] It is the general and well established jurisdictional 
rule that a plaintiff who seeks judicial relief against an 
organization of which he is a member must first invoke and 
exhaust the remedies provided by that organization appli-
cable to his grievance. (Lawson v. Hewell, supra, 118 Cal. 
613; Levy v. Magnolia Lodge No. 29, I.O.O.F., 110 Cal. 
297 [ 42 P. 887] .) This rule is analogous to the rule requir-
ing the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition 
precedent to resorting to the courts (see 2 Cal.Jur.2d 304), 
and to the rule requiring the parties to a contract for arbitra-
tion of disputes to exhaust those remedies before seeking 
judicial relief. (See Cone v. Union Oil Co., 129 Cal.App.2d 
558 [277 P.2d 464], and cases collected at p. 563.) Such 
rules are based on a practical approach to the solution of 
internal problems, complaints and grievances that arise be-
tween parties functioning pursuant to special and complex 
agreements or other arrangements. They make possible the 
settlement of such matters by simple, expeditious and inex-
pensive procedures, and by persons who, generally, are 
familiar therewith. Such internal remedies are designed not 
only to promote the settlement of grievances but also to pro-
mote more harmonious relationships, and the courts look with 
favor upon them. 
The plaintiff claims that an exception to the general rule 
made it unnecessary that he pursue the internal remedies 
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for review before commencing this action. In W tiber v. 
1l1arine Cooks' &: Stewards' Assn., 93 Cal.App.2d 327 [208 
P.2d 1009), it is stated at page 338 that "where an organ-
ization has violated its own laws and arbitrarily violated a 
member's property rights the rule of exhaustion of remedies 
to a higher body within the organization need not 
be adhered to before direct resort to a judicial tribunal.'' 
(See Harris v. National Union etc. Cooks & Stewards, 98 Cal. 
App.2d 733 at 736 [221 P.2d 136].) If such an exception 
is construed as broadly as the quoted language would permit, 
it· would make it unnecessary for any party with a justified 
grievance involving personal and property rights against an 
organization of which he is a member, including the plaintiff 
in the present case, to have the matter corrected internally by 
the machinery provided before resorting to the courts. The 
exception in such a case would swallow the rule, a result 
clearly not intended by the cases relied on as authority for 
the broad interpretation sought by the plaintiff to justify 
this action. [2] It is only when the organization violates 
its rules for appellate review or upon a showing that it would 
be futile to invoke them that the further pursuit of internal 
relief is excused. The violation of its own rules which inflicts 
the initial wrong furnishes no right for direct resort to the 
courts. 
The statement of the exception in the Weber case, discussed 
only incidentally with other points considered determinative, 
is said to have resulted from a holding in Simpson v. Sa~vation 
Army, 49 CaLA.pp.2d 371 [121 P.2d 847]. In that ease the 
court set forth the exception in almost identical language, 
with citations, and then stated at page 375: "Obviously, that 
exception is not here involved.'' In one of the two cases 
there relied on (N eto v. Conselho Amor Da Sociedade, 18 Cal. 
App. 234 [122 P. 973]) the court stated the exception, citing 
the other case as authority therefor, but refused to apply 
the exception. Thus the authority for the quoted language 
is easily traced to that other case, Sckou v. Sotoyome Tribe, 
No. 12 (1903), 140 Cal. 254 [73 P. 996]. The holding in 
that case, however, does not justify the interpretation the 
plaintiff in the present case would place upon it. There 
relief was sought by the plaintiff Mrs. Schou in behalf of her 
husband, a member of the Sotoyome Tribe of the Improved 
Order of Redmen of California, a fraternal and benevolent 
organization. His application for sick benefits was refused 





constitution of the organi-
feel at the 
pay benefits that may be 
such person must appeal from such action 
thereof within 20 suns after said 
sachem shall without delay appoint 
order a commissioner to take such 
offer in relation to the case.'' 
denial of his application, Mrs. 
made but unavailing 
efforts to obtain information of the tribe's decision. The 
opinion then relates that ''Thereafter she was informed by 
the tribe that 'she would have to take the case before the 
great sachem.' In response to this, her attorneys wrote to 
the great sachem him for information as to the proper 
procedure, aud were by the great sachem informed simply 
that he had uo in the matter. Finally, Mrs. 
Schou's gave the tribe notice of an appeal 'to the 
great sachem and council,' and sent an appeal to the 
great council, but, so far as she or her attorneys were advised, 
neither the tribe nor the great council paid any attention 
to these No commissioner was appointed to take 
evidence, no 'ten suns' notice, nor any notice at all, was 
given, nor was nor Mrs. Schou upon his behalf, ever 
allowed to present any evidence. In this condition of affairs, 
not knowing whether or not she was to be allowed to prosecute 
her appeal, or if it would be entertained by the great council 
of the and had no opportunity at all to present 
her evidence as to Sc1JOu 's right to the sick benefits" she 
resorted to court action. 
The foregoing account of Mrs. Schou's inability to obtain 
an appeal within the machinery provided, although she her-
self complied with all made known to her, caused 
the court to conclude it to be "perfectly clear" that she 
"was relieved from furtlJer compliance, or attempt at com-
pliance, with the regulations and procedure of the order 
touching appeals. . . . Before an order can hold a member 
to strict observance of its rules regulating procedure on 
appeal it must show that in all matters touching his sub-
stantial rights it has itself observed these regulations, and 
this the defendant did not do. Its dereliction in this regard 
excuses a claimant from exhausting his remedy within the 
rules of the order.'' 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the court in the 
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Schou case excused the 's further attempt at compli-
ance wtih internal rules of appeal because the organization 
itself arbitrarily refused to comply with and be governed by 
those same internal rules of appeal and for all practical pur-
poses it became impossible for the plaintiff to obtain a review 
of the action claimed to be improper. Accordingly, the 
statement in the \Veber case to an exception to the 
rule ''where an organization has violated its own 
laws," can have reference only to its rules on appeal, the 
violation of which in effect prevented an aggrieved party from 
seeking redress thereunder. [3] A violation of other laws 
and wrongs done within the organization are intended to be 
conciliated and corrected by the appellate machinery provided 
therein, if properly invoked by an aggrieved party and applied 
by the organization. If recourse to such appellate machinery 
is not sought an aggrieved party foregoes his right to a judicial 
review regardless of the breach of its own rules by the organi-
zation in causing the grievance in the first instance. If the 
organization fails to apply its appellate machinery after it is 
properly invoked and in effect prevents an appeal from being 
taken, the aggrieved party, under the Schou case, need not 
pursue such an appeal further. Any implications in the 
statement of the exception to the general rule in the cases 
heretofore cited are accordingly limited. 
[4] In the present case the plaintiff made no attempt 
to obtain an internal appeal, and there is nothing to indicate 
that an appeal would not have been accorded him in which 
to seek redress for the alleged wrongs. He falls squarely 
within the rule that when an internal appeal is open to him 
he has no right to invoke the aid of the courts. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-1 dissent. 
The majority in this case holds that a member of a union 
cannot obtain relief in the courts when he has been t>xpelled 
without the notice or hearing required by the union's consti-
tution and by-laws because he did not appeal the expulsion to 
a higher authority in the union which he had the right to do 
under the circumstances. This exhaustion of remedies within 
the union is the universal rule on the subject but there are 
\'xceptions to it, one of which is that it does not apply where 
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the union has violated its own law with to 
The majority states that there is no reason for the exception, 
and that to apply it completely wipes out the rule, and 
mentions some of the cases upholding the exception, and, in 
effect, disapproves them, but it does not do so expressly. It 
has been held in this state that where the union or other 
unincorporated association fails to give notice and hearing for 
an expulsion, the member need not exhaust a remedy by appeal 
under the constitution of the association. (Swital v. Real 
Estate Comr., 116 Cal.App.2d 677 [254 P.2d 587] ; Ell'is v. 
American Federation of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440 [120 P.2d 
79]; Stoica v. International etc. Emp., 78 Cal.App.2d 533 [178 
P.2d 21]; Weber v. Marine Cooks' & Stewards' Assn., 93 Cal. 
App.2d 327 [208 P.2d 1009]; Smetherham v. La~tndry Work-
ers' Uni011, 44 Cal.App.2d 131 [111 P.2d 948].) The exception 
is nearly universally recognized. It is said in 168 A.L.R. 
1462, 1468, citiug cases from California, Georgia, Indiana, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Penn-
sylvania and the federal courts: ""Where the provisions 
of the constitution and the bylaws as to suspension or ex-
pulsion are not complied with, as where no notice or hearing 
is given to the member, no written charges are preferred 
against him as required by the constitution and the bylaws, 
or where the decision for expulsion is contrary to the consti-
tution and bylaws of the union, or the offense with which the 
member is charged is not a ground for expulsion, or where 
the expulsion or suspension is void for lack of authority or 
jurisdiction in the body or person conducting the trial or 
rendering the decision for suspension or expulsion, or is 
otherwise irregular, the requirement that the internal remedies 
within the union mnst first be exhausted will not be insisted 
upon as a condition to grant of equitable relief for reinstate-
ment, as in all these cases the action of expulsion or suspension 
is not the authorized action of the union, and the member's 
duty to exhaust first the internal remedies within the union 
is generally understood as contemplating an action of the 
union which is authorized under its constitution and the by-
laws. In other words, the rule as to exhaustion of internal 
remedies pre-supposes a legal and regular proceeding for 
suspension or expulsion.'' (See also 20 A.I.J.R.2d 531. 565 ; 
id., 344, 386; 4 Am.Jur., Associations & Clubs, § 31.) There 
should be given a definitive reason why those authorities are 
wrong. Moreover the plaintiff-exnelled member-sought 
da~ as well as reinstatement. The appellate body in 
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the union has and inasmuch 
as it is clear that was illegally expelled, it would 
appear that his right to damages would not be affected by his 
failure to 
In a case like the one here an appeal would be an idle act 
and thus unnecessary, for the majority states: "There is no 
question but that the provisions in the union's constitution for 
the expulsion of members were not followed. That document 
requires that formal charges be filed and a hearing be had.'' 
That being true the appellate body could do nothing else 
but reverse the expulsion; if it did not a court would do so. 
In effect the appeal could serve no useful function. 
Finally, it should be remembered that the constitution and 
by-laws of the union constitute a contract between the mem-
bers and the association and one of the reasons for the rule 
that an expelled member must pursue his remedy within the 
association before resorting to the courts is that the contract 
requires him to do so. However, where the member has been 
expelled in violation of that contract the association has 
repudiated it and it is no longer binding on the member. A 
breach of contract or a refusal to perform by one of the parties 
excuses the other party, not at fault, from performance on 
his part. (Twomey v. People's Ice Co., 66 Cal. 233 [5 P. 158]; 
Gold Min. & Water Co. v. Swinerton, 23 Cal.2d 19 [142 P.2d 
22] ; Central Oil Co. v. Southern Refining Co., 154 Cal. 165 [97 
P. 177].) Hence in this case plaintiff was excused from per-
formance of the contract requiring an appeal to a higher 
authority in the union because of the union's repudiation and 
violation of the contract requiring a notice and hearing. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
